SMITH v. ARBA UGH'S RESTAURANT, INC., AND THE
INVITEE-LICENSEE-TRESPASSER DISTINCTION
In Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc.,1 a three-judge panel of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has followed the lead
of the Supreme Court of California2 in abolishing the common law status
distinctions between invitees, licensees, and trespassers, as determinative
of the duty of care owed by a land occupier to entrants on his land.
Plaintiff in the case was a health inspector who had come to inspect the
defendant restaurant's barbecue pits. Descending metal stairs, he slipped
on a worn, greasy step, and was injured. At the trial on the negligence
action, the court left to the jury the issues of the plaintiff's status
(licensee or invitee) and the defendant's compliance with the corresponding duty of care. The jury found for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court should have ruled as a matter
of law that the plaintiff was an invitee.' In an opinion by Chief Judge
Bazelon, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a jury finding
on the defendant's compliance with a duty of "maintaining its property
in a condition reasonably safe under all the circumstances," without
the defendant's duty being defined by the plaintiff's entrant status.4
Previous District of Columbia law,5 consistent with the common
law of nearly all American jurisdictions, 6 held that a land occupier's'
I No.

23,748 (D.C. Cir., June 30, 1972).
2 Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). In
form, but not in substance, Rowland was the result of statutory interpretation rather
than common law. See 44 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 426, 432 (1969). Three courts have followed
Rowland purely as a matter of common law: Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, - Colo.
-, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452
P.2d 445 (1969); Peterson v. Balach, - Minn. -, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972) (abolishing
distinction between licensees and invitees without reaching question of trespassers). The
Rowland decision has received considerable comment in the reviews, e.g., 44 N.Y.U.L.
R v. 426 (1969); 25 VAND. L. Rav. 623 (1972). In view of the existing commentary,
much of the discussion herein is devoted to an analysis of the novel approach taken in
the concurring opinion of judge Leventhal. See note 27 infra & accompanying text.
3 Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., No. 23,748, at 1-4; see note 11 infra.
4
1d. at 21. Judge Wright joined with Chief Judge Bazelon to form the majority.
Judge Leventhal concurred in a separate opinion.
The court also approved, giving the matter only footnote treatment, an instruction
by the trial court "that if the jury found that there was a foreign substance on the
staircase, that it must also find that someone in charge 'had sufficient time to ascertain
that condition."' Id. at 3-4 n.2. The cases cited by the court, however, do not support
that conclusion unless it is assumed that the substance on the steps was left by an
outsider. Such an assumption would seem unjustified based on the court's description of
the facts.
5 See id. at 5-6.
6
See RESTATEmrT (SacouN) or TORTS §§ 328E-350 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATE mNT]; W. PRossER, HANBoox oF = LAW Or ToRTs 351-99 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as W. PRossaa, TORTs]. The exceptions are California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, and, since the date of decision in Arbaugh's Restaurant,
Minnesota. See note 27 infra. See generally Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v.
Landowner: Basis of Responsibility in Tort, 21 McH. L. REV. 495 (1923); Hughes,
Duties to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and Revaluation, 68 Y=x.n L.J. 633 (1959);
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duty of care to an entrant upon his property was determined solely by
the entrant's technical status as a trespasser, licensee9 (including social
guests1'), or invitee." Originally, a land occupier was bound to exercise
ordinary care toward invitees, but was only required to avoid willful
or wanton injury to trespassers or licensees.' This immunity 3 from the
duty of reasonable care toward trespassers and licensees was based on
the concept of a land occupier's right to complete freedom in the use
and exploitation of his own property, a notion that solidified in the
law prior to the crystallization of the general negligence standard. 4
The harshness' 5 and inflexibility'0 of this doctrine generated a spate
of exceptions for artificial conditions on the land, child trespassers,
known or constant trespassers, dangerous activities, known dangers, and
active negligence,'" and differentiations between the standard of care
owed to licensees and that owed to trespassers. The continuing process
James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63 YArs L.J.
144 (1953) [hereinafter cited as James, Trespassers]; James, Tort Liability of Occupiers
of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE L.. 605 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as James, Licensees & Invitees]; Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of
Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. Rav. 182, 359 (1953); Prosser, Business
Visitors and Invitees, 26 Minw. L. REv. 573 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Prosser,
Invitees].
7For the precise meaning of "land occupier" as used in this context, see Smith v.
Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., No. 23,748, at 5 n.5; James, Trespassers, supra note 6, at
146-48. The court does not refer to the standard of care owed an entrant on personal
property such as an automobile. See generally W. PROSSER, TORaTS, supra note 6, at 357
n.66, 382-84; Occupiers' Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, § 1(3) (a) (1957).
8"A trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession of
another without a privilege to do so ...." RESTATEmNT, supra note 6, § 329.

o "A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue
of the possessor's consent." Id. § 330.
10 Id. § 330, comment h.
11
nvitees include business visitors and public invitees. Id. § 332(1). "A business
visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or
indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land." Id. § 332(3).
"A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a member
of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public." Id. § 332(2).
See notes 34-36 infra & accompanying text. The status of a public health inspector has
not been determined in the District of Columbia. See Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant,
Inc., No. 23,748, at 4 n.3. While there is some controversy as to the status of public
employees in general, Prosser, Invitees, supra note 6, at 608-11, health inspectors differ
from firemen or policemen entering at unexpected hours, Note, Landowner's Negligence
Liability to Persons Entering as a Matter of Right or Under a Privilege of Private
Necessity, 19 VAarn. L. REv. 407, 428-31 (1966), and should be treated as invitees.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 345, comment c.
12 Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARv. L. Rry. 725, 739 (1937); see Sweeny v.
Old Colony & N.R.R., 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 368, 372-73 (1865). See generally authorities
cited note 6 supra.
1a The lower standards of care required are correctly considered immunities rather
than attempts to define foreseeability. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 117-18,
443 P.2d 561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1968); 44 N.Y.U.L. R-v.426, 431 n.42 (1969).
But cf. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., No. 23,748, at 11.
14
Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Toward Those Entering His Premises of Their
Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 237, 237-39 (1921); Marsh, supra note 6, at 183-86.
15 See Hughes, supra note 6, at 686.
10 See Robert Addle & Sons (Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358, 371.
17See RESTATEmENT, supra note 6, §§ 333-42, 343B, 345.
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of expanding the categories of exceptions and straining the limits18
of the established exceptions in an attempt to reach a fair determination,
has resulted in a complexity 9 and artificiality" of rules which has
received considerable criticism."'
The court of appeals specifically noted in Arbaugh's Restaurant
the confusion in the law as developed in the District of Columbia and
elsewhere, 2 but its decision to dismantle the status distinctions rested
primarily on a conviction that the common law system of immunities
failed to comport with modern values and reality. No longer, said
the court, could "the preeminence of land over life," be automatically
accepted." By lifting the status distinction rules, the jury, as the community's representative, can serve fully and flexibly in each case as
the arbiter of reasonable standards of care. 4
In his concurring opinion, Judge Leventhal advocated that the
rules of entrant classifications be abolished only with respect to entrants on the property of a business establishment.2 5 Rejecting the
majority's conclusion that modern values dictated a duty of reasonable
care by all land occupants to all entrants, Judge Leventhal relied on
two distinctions between business and residential property. First, given
business realities and the ambiguities of such values as goodwill, almost
any person's presence on a business establishment's property confers
some benefit on the business; thus trespassers and licensees on business property are indistinguishable from invitees. Secondly, a business
establishment can efficiently distribute the liability burden through
insurance or self-insurance, spreading the cost among its customers.
Conversely, it is argued that neither of these generalizations holds true
as applied to residential property.26 Both the respect generally due the
18 See, e.g., Gould v. DeBeve, 330 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; Hansen v. Richey, 237
Cal. App. 2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Benedict v. Podwats, 57 NJ.
219, 222-24, 271 A.2d 417, 419-21 (1970) (Hall, J., dissenting).
19
See, e.g., Daisey v. Colonial Parking, Inc., 331 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
20
See, e.g., West v. Tan, 322 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1963) (restaurant patron, invitee
in dining room, held to be licensee on band platform where she was permitted to play
piano); Walsh v. Sun Oil Co., 437 Pa. 80, 89-90 n.4, 262 A.2d 128, 132 n.4 (1970)
(Roberts, J., concurring & dissenting) (duty of care might "depend on the scope of the
fire and the location of the victim"). Compare Braun v. Vallade, 33 Cal. App. 279, 164
P. 904 (Dist. Ct. App. 1917), with Kneiser v. Belasco-Blackwood Co., 22 Cal. App. 205,
133 P. 989 (Dist. Ct. App. 1913) (duty of care owed to one who buys drink in tavern
differs
from duty owed to one whose drinks were purchased by another).
21
E.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31
(1959) (declining to import into admiralty law a system of distinctions it termed a
"semantic morass"). See generally Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 115-16, 443
P.2d 561, 566, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102 (1968); Hughes, supra note 6, at 648-49.
22 Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., No. 23,748, at 10, 12-15.
23
1d. at 8. "With urbanized society comes closer living conditions and a more
gregarious population. The trespasser who steps from a public sidewalk onto a private
parking lot today is not the 'outlaw' or 'poacher' whose entry was both unanticipated
and resented in the nineteenth century." Id. at 11.
24 Id. at 9-10. The presence of status distinction rules alters the jury's function
from one of determining reasonableness to one of defining status. Id. at 14 n.32.
25
1d. at 21-23.
2

6Id.
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writer's opinions, and the novelty of the position, 27 demand an analysis
of Judge Leventhal's position. This discussion should also illuminate
the basis and the effects of the majority decision.
The immediate objection to a distinction between residential and
business property in this context, noted by the majority,28 is that its
implementation would generate further complexity in an already confusing area. Initial difficulty arises in defining the term business establishment and determining whether it should apply normatively, as the
term is commonly used, or functionally. Although, for example, the
same difficulties encountered in the business context may exist in
classifying the status of an entrant on certain government or church
owned property,2 9 and although those owners may be capable of supporting and distributing the burden of risk of entrant injuries, such
property is not generally considered a business establishment. Furthermore, Judge Leventhal would eliminate status distinctions for businesses which do not deal with the public, despite the facility with
which the status of entrants on such property can be determined. The
difficulty is aggravated by the apparent assumption that land must
either support a business establishment or be residential. Under this
dichotomy the status of land held for investment or sale, for example,
is uncertain,3 0 and residential property used partially for business,
such as a doctor's office, would apparently be considered a business
establishment in relation to certain entrants. 3 ' If the status of such
multi-use property is to vary according to the reason for the visitor's
presence, then the determination of whether that property is business
or residential will generally be nothing more than a determination of
whether the visitor is a business invitee or social guest. 2 Moreover,
27No jurisdiction has adopted the distinction proposed by Judge Leventhal. California, Colorado, and Hawaii have entirely abolished the status distinctions as determinative of the standard of care due an entrant upon land. See note 2 supra. The Supreme
Court of Minnesota has abolished the distinction between licensees and invitees. Peterson
v. Balach, - Minn. -, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972). The standard of care distinction between
invitees and social guests has been abolished in Connecticut and Louisiana. Co-M. GEIT.
STAT. ANN. § 52-557a (Supp. 1972); Daire v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 143
So. 2d 389 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1962); Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Life
Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1957). In Great Britain the
distinction between standards of care due invitees and licensees has been abolished by
statute. Occupiers' Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957). But see Gould v. DeBeve, 330
F.2d 826, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1964): "One who puts his land to profitable use by building
apartments and inviting significant numbers of people to lead their lives therein inevitably
takes on an aspect different from the country squire who wants mainly to be left alone

on his rural acres."
28 Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., No. 23,748, at 19-20.
29 Cf. Firfer v. United States, 208 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
SOArguably the categorization of land held for investment might depend on whether
or not the land was developed, and whether it was owned by an individual, a trust, or a
corporation.
31 Cf. RESTATEmENT, supra note 6, § 332, comment e.
32
Other problems of classification could occur if invitees on multi-use property
exceed the scope of their invitation. If a door-to-door salesman invited into a doctor's
home enters the separate office without authorization should the office be considered
business property, thus resulting in a different standard of care than if the visitor had
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under such a distinction, unequal standards would be perpetuated, 3
although on a different theory, in apartment house cases, where the
standard of care of the lessor to a lessee's social guest would be higher
than that of the lessee to his guest, because what is business property
as to the former is residential property as to the latter.
Thus, Judge Leventhal's approach would implant a further obstacle in the path of a jury determination of negligence. First, a determination of the type of land must be made. Then, if the land is found
to be residential, a determination of the plaintiff's status at the time of
the accident must follow. Only then is it possible that the jury could
reach the fundamental question of reasonable care under the circumstances.
The proposed distinction between residential and business property is not only overly complex, but is based on inaccurate analysis,
and thus does not represent the appropriate reformation of the common law. Judge Leventhal's first argument for treating the two types
of property differently, that with regard to business property the traditional status distinctions are "mischievous" due to the inherent difficulty in distinguishing among trespassers, licensees, and invitees,
assumes that the purpose heretofore served by such classification was
to identify those entrants who conferred a benefit on the land occupier,
and that only those entrants who conferred such a benefit were due
reasonably safe premises. But this ignores the now generally accepted
view that one who is invited onto property simply as a member of
the public is also an invitee, 4 even if "the visitor's presence is in no
way related ...

to any possibility of benefit or advantage, present or

prospective, pecuniary or otherwise, to the possessor."3 5 Thus, the basis
of the invitation theory is not that the visitor confers a benefit on the
possessor, but, that the occupier has led the entrant to believe that
the premises were intended for visitors to use, and, by implication,
has represented it as safe.3 6 Although social guests have been afforded
invitee protections on this theory in only a few jurisdictions, 37 it is

reasonably argued that social guests rely on the same implied repentered a bedroom without authorization? A similar question arises if a social guest
is given a tour of his accountant's home: should it matter whether the guest is injured in
the kitchen or the office?
33
See RESTATEUMNT, supra note 6, § 332, comment k; cf. Solon Serv., Inc. v. Cook,
223 F.2d
317 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
34
See RESTATEMENT, supra

note 6, § 332(2). This position was advocated in
Prosser, Invitees, supra note 6, at 602, and adopted in the District of Columbia in Firfer
v. United States, 208 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1953).

35 RESTATEENT, supra note 6, § 332, comment d at 179.
36 See W. PRossaR, TORTS, supra note 6, at 385-91; James, Licensees & Invitees,

supra note 6, at 612-23. It is unclear whether the original distinction between licensees
and invitees was based on the financial benefit conferred by the invitee or the implied
representation that a place held open to the public was safe. See Peterson v. Balach, Minn. -, -, 199 N.W.2d 639, 645 (1972).
37See note 27 supra.
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resentations of safety.38 Additionally, if occupant benefit is to be relevant to a determination of duty, it can be argued persuasively that
most social guests confer real benefits upon their hosts, and should
therefore receive the protection of invitee status. 39
Judge Leventhal's second argument, that, in general, only business
use of property allows for efficient distribution of liability losses, under-

estimates the significance of low-cost liability insurance for residential
land occupiers. 04 Admittedly, unlike the occupier of business property,

the occupier of residential property cannot distribute the cost of insurance or self-insurance among customers, but liability insurance is, in

itself, a sufficient method for distributing loss. Once injuries are sustained, it is no more costly for the land occupier, rather than the
injured entrant, to bear the loss caused by the occupier's carelessness.41
Nor should it generally be more costly for one party rather than the

other to prepare for and distribute such costs through insurance. Most
importantly, placing liability on the land occupier for injuries suffered
on property not reasonably safe, places the cost where it belongs, and
lays the incentive for precaution on the party best able to prevent

accidents. Even if the occupier has insurance, the desire to avoid lawsuits, and the fear that the insurance company will increase its
premium rates if it believes the insured's premises are 4unsafe,
will
2
provide an incentive for safe maintenance of the property.
38

See McCleary, The Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons Injured While on the Land, 1 Mo. L. REv. 45, 58 (1936); cf. Prosser, Invitees, supra note
6, at 604.
39 "It would seem that in the usual case such [social] visits may very well be to
the mutual advantage of the parties, although not in the commercial or business conception of advantage." McCleary, supra note 38, at 58. Cf. Daire v. Southern Farm
Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 143 So. 2d 389 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1962); Alexander v. General
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730 (La. Cir. Ct. App. 1957). The
courts have stretched the notion of benefit in order to allow a recovery in certain cases
where the entrant was similar to a social guest. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Horton, 102
Mont. 135, 56 P.2d 1344 (1936); Benedict v. Podwats, 109 N.J. Super. 402, 263 A.2d
486 (App. Div.), aff'd per curiam, 57 N.J. 219, 271 A.2d 417 (1970). But see Benedict
v. Podwats, 57 N.J. 219, 219, 271 A.2d 417, 417 (1970) (Hall, J., dissenting); XV.
PRossER, TORTS, supra note 6, at 378 (distinguishing cases where social guest performs
an incidental chore from those where entrant comes onto property to provide a personal
service, and questioning that distinction). The commentators have also noted that the
invitation theory serves as a better explanation of the results in certain other applications of the benefit theory, such as those based on a finding of good will. See id. 385-91;
James,
Licensees & Invitees, supra note 6, at 612-19.
4
oSee Hughes, supra note 6, at 691; James, Trespassers, supra note 6, at 152;
James, Licensees & Invitees, supra note 6, at 611-12. The availability of insurance was
a factor considered by the California Supreme Court in determining whether the status
distinctions should be perpetuated. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 443 P.2d
561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103-04 (1968). See notes 54-56 infra & accompanying text.
41 The exception to this generalization is for the cost involved in a litigation or
settlement
process.
42
Extending the duty of reasonable care may result in increased costs of liability
insurance, but such increases may well be slight. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
117-19, 443 P.2d 561, 567-68, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103-04 (1968). Increased premiums
should not be allowed to prevent the placing of liability on the negligent party. Furthermore, as part of the reallocation of risk, if liability insurance rates go up because of
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It is upon this issue of the allocation of the costs of injury that
the majority opinion bases its conviction that the land occupier immunities are contrary to modern policy.43 And it is at this point that the
concurring opinion fundamentally differs from the majority. Judge
Leventhal's conclusion must rest finally upon his perception of the
controlling policies that "rough common sense" supports "the notion
that a social guest, broadly, takes a host as he is, expecting that the
host will take as much care of his guest as he takes of himself .... ,,44
The majority observes, more realistically, that whether such care as a
host may pay himself is sufficient as due a guest is a question of the
circumstances. 5 Certainly a guest who relies upon his host, as he must,
to provide safe premises cannot be said to assume the burden of risk
of injury simply because his host carelessly neglects to look out for
himself as well. Judge Leventhal more strenuously objects to the notion
that a homeowner might be required specially to prepare his property
for the safety of trespassers 6 Again, this possibility must be tested
against the standard of reasonability. Special precautions are not required for unexpected trespassers 7 However, in a society where technical trespass is often harmless, condoned, and even expected, there is
little justice in providing a blanket immunity for injuries to all types
of trespassers, without distinction, for many reasonably avoidable injuries4 It is far better to accept the majority's position that the
circumstances of entry are only relevant to a determination of foreseeability of presence, and thus one factor to be considered by the jury
in determining the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct.
Judge Leventhal notes that application of a general negligence
standard will expose residential property owners to suits not previously
permitted and encourage homeowners to concede fault readily when
they are insured.' The first objection could be made to any expansion
in the law, proper or improper, and should not control here so as to
deny a remedy to injured parties. And, the possibility of fraud or collusion exists under any standard of care"0 and is best left to the crimmore successful claims, by hypothesis, the cost of personal injury insurance should go
down, since fewer accidents will require payment under such polities.
43
Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., No. 23,748, at 9-12.
44
Id. at 23 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
45 Id. at 20 (majority opinion).
46

Id. at 23 (Leventhal, J., concurring).

47 Cf. id at 19 (majority opinion). See generally James, Trespassers, supra note 6,
at 151-52.

48
See Green, supra note 6, at 516; Hughes, supra note 6, at 686-88; James, Trespassers, supra note 6, at 153. In an effort to avoid inequitable results in trespasser cases,
the courts have strained the traditional status classifications, see, e.g., Muldrow v. Daly,
329 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Daisey v. Colonial Parking, Inc., 331 F.2d 777 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); and the definition of willful or wanton negligence, cf., e.g., Gould v. DeBeve,

330 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1964).

49 Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., No. 23,748, at 22-23 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
50 Cf. 2 F. HARPER & F.

JAims, Tn

LAW OF ToRTs § 16.15, at 961 (1956):

"The
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inal courts rather than being used to justify unwarranted limitations
on land occupiers' duty.5 '
Judge Bazelon's opinion for the court, in changing the common
law, leaves some confusion as to the proper standard for the jury to
apply in determining a land occupier's liability. The court, in specifying the role of the jury, adopts at one point the standard of "reasonable care under all the circumstances," 5 under which the jury should
balance the likelihood and seriousness of injury against the sacrifice
required to avoid the risk.53 Elsewhere the court purports to follow
the California Supreme Court in stating that, "the jury should consider 'the closeness of the connection between the injury and the defendant's conduct, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct,
the policy of preventing future harm, and the prevalence and availability of insurance.' "I Clearly the former is the proper standard."
As to the latter, it is apparent that the court has misread the California
opinion and confused the jury's considerations for determining liability
under the law with the court's considerations for deciding whether a
common law immunity should be perpetuated.5 6 Properly considered,
the morality of a defendant's activities and the availability of insurance to a defendant are not relevant, as such, to the narrow determination of a defendant's reasonable care or negligence.
The majority's opinion in Arbaugh's Restaurant also offers little
insight as to how the general negligence principles will apply to land
occupier liability cases. Apparently the care formerly due invitees will
now be due all entrants." Three limitations of such easy application,
however, deserve mention. First, as the court notes, the circumstances
of entry will often bear some relation to the foreseeability of an entrant's presence, and thus the degree of care required under the circumstances.5" Secondly, under all the circumstances, "what might be a
purposes of the [automobile guest] statutes were to [avoid] . . . dishonest collusion
between guest and host against the host's insurance carrier. But if there is dishonesty, it
will not stick at fabricating whatever relationship the law requires." Under the traditional
status distinction rules in real property cases, a host wishing to allow his guest to
recover from his insurance company can falsify both the guest's status and his own
culpability.
51 Cf. White, The Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-paying Passenger,20
VA. L. REV. 326, 333 (1934); 54 Nw. U.L. Rav. 263, 273-74 (1959).
52 Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., No. 23,748, at 17; see id. at 7, 20-21.
53 Id. at 17-18, 20.
54 Id. at 11 (quoting in part Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 117, 443 P.2d
561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1968)).
55
See Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940).
56 Compare Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 100 (1968), with id. at 117, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
57See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 341A, 343-44; authorities cited note
6 supra. The opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court in Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich,
Colo. -, 489 P.2d 308 (1971), is particularly unhelpful on this aspect, as it is apparently based on a faulty analysis of the Restatement position. 25 VAND. L. REV. 623,
634-35 (1972).
5
8 Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., No. 23,748, at 19; ef. Rowland v. Christian,
69 Cal. 2d 108, 117-18, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1968). But cf. RESTATE-
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'reasonable' maintenance burden for one homeowner may require unreasonable sacrifices for another." 5 9 This should not be construed,
however, as relieving any land occupier from the duty of at least
warning known entrants of risks or defects not corrected.60 Thirdly,
it seems proper that a land occupier may continue to assume that
trespassers and those licensees who should be aware that their presence
on the property is unknown and unforeseen, will ordinarily exercise
considerable caution of their own, in the realization that the premises
were not prepared for them.61 Of course, the usefulness of this generalization is somewhat diminished when applied to children.62 Although the circumstances of entry continue to be relevant, the new
approach will not merely duplicate the old mesh of rules since foreseeability is not equivalent to status and is only one of many factors
the jury should consider.6 ' Generally, application of the reasonable care
standard should have its most dramatic impact in cases involving
foreseeable trespassers, 64 social guests,65 and invitees who exceed the
scope of their invitation and become technical licensees or trespassers. 6
In brief reiteration, two basic arguments are generally marshalled
against the traditional doctrine regarding the liability of land occupiers
for injuries sustained by entrants on their land. First, it is said that
the general negligence standard should apply to liability for injuries
connected with land occupancy because that standard represents a
mENT,
supra note 6, § 333, comment b (occupier privileged to ignore actual probability
of trespassers). Some trespassers are in fact foreseeable. See, e.g., Muldrow v. Daly, 329
F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Daisey v. Colonial Parking, Inc., 331 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir.
1963). The circumstances of entry, under the majority's holding, are relevant to the
foreseeability of the plaintiff's presence on the property, but are not relevant to the
further question whether the reasonable man would have foreseen that his conduct
would cause injury to anyone who was on the premises. See 44 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 426,
431-32 n.42 (1969).
59 Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., No. 23,748, at 20.
60 Cf. RESTATEmNT, supra note 6, § 343, comment d.
61
See James, Trespassers, supra note 6, at 158; RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 335,
comment f, § 342, comment f; cf. Peterson v. Balach, - Minn. -, -; 199 N.W.2d 639,
647 (1972) (trespassers expected to exercise reasonable care). See also Prosser, Invitees,
supra note 6, at 604 (questioning the rationalization given by the courts that social
guests expect no more than the care due licensees).
62 Cf. Beard v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 4 Cal. App. 3d 129, 136-37, 84 Cal. Rptr.
449, 454 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970); McGettigan v. National Bank, 320 F.2d 703, 707 (D.C.
Cir. 1963). Compare REsTATEVINT, supra note 6, § 339, with id. § 343B, comment c.
It is 'relevant in this regard that the English statute abolishing the licensee-invitee
distinction specifically mentions that an occupier must take into account that children
will be less careful than adults. Occupiers' Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, § 2(3) (a)
(1957). Prosser has questioned "whether the rules as to trespassing children . . . will
be jettisoned completely in favor of a free hand for the jury." W. PRossER, TORTS, supra
note 6, at 399 n.4.
63 See Gibo v. Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 299, 301, 459 P.2d 198, 200 (1969) (foreseeability of entrance held not to depend on status).
64 See note 58 supra.
65
See Peterson v. Balach, - Minn. -, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972); Rowland v. Christian,
69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
66
E.g., Firfer v. United States, 208 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1953); see RESTATEMNT,
supra note 6, § 332, comment 1.
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flexible vehicle for a fair determination of proper care and an equitable allocation of the costs of injury in accordance with prevailing
community standards, and because there is no reason for making exceptions based on feudalistic classifications. 67 Alternatively, it is said that
a duty of reasonable care is due to social guests, on the theory that
they, like public invitees, rely upon a host's implied affirmation of the
safety of his property, or that they, like business invitees, do provide
certain real benefits to their host.6 8
Judge Leventhal, in his concurrence, rejected both arguments.
It is respectfully submitted, however, that although his concurring
opinion properly noted the difficulty in classifying entrants on business
property, it fails to provide an adequate rationale for continuing to
ignore the ambiguity of the status distinctions for entrants on other
property. More broadly, it is submitted that Judge Leventhal's rejection of the general negligence standard was based on unrealistic policy
considerations.
The majority opinion in Arbaugh's Restaurant, more soundly, embraced the standard of "reasonable care under all the circumstances."
That opinion, however, is marred in its specification of the proper jury
standards by an apparent misinterpretation of the California decision
in Rowland v. Christian, an ambiguity which should be corrected at
the first opportunity. 69
Cf. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-32 (1959).
See notes 36-38 supra & accompanying text; cf. Peterson v. Balach, - Minn. -,
199 N.W.2d 639 (1972); Occupiers' Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 (1957) (abolishing
distinctions
between invitees and licensees).
69
Any clarification may have to come from the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals.
One district judge, sitting in a diversity case, has held that Smith v. Arbaugh's
Restaurant, Inc., did not alter the common law of the District of Columbia because
the decision was made after the effective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970, D.C. CoD AwN. §§ 11-101 et seq. (Supp. V, 1972), which, in
§ 11-102, proclaimed that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, rather than the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, was that jurisdiction's highest court, with review only in the Supreme Court. Luck v. Baltimore &
O.R.R., 41 U.S.L.W. 2346 (D.D.C., Dec. 13, 1972). See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310,
312 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) ("[Wle are not bound by the decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals rendered after [February 1, 1971]."). Appellee's request in Arbaugh's
Restaurant for either a rehearing or a rehearing en banc to consider this issue, and to
reconsider the substantive issues, was denied. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., No.
23,748 (D.C. Cir., Jan. 5, 1973).
Whatever the precedential value of the decision, the opinions in Smith v. Arbaugh's
Restaurant,Inc., will be valuable for other courts, including the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, should they reevaluate the common law status distinctions of entrants on land.
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